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Unpacking Adaptability
Andreas Engert and D. Gordon Smith
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal Origins Theory holds that “legal origins—broadly
interpreted as highly persistent systems of social control of economic
life—have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory
framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.”1 First
proposed over a decade ago in a pair of papers by Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny
(“LLSV”),2 Legal Origins Theory quickly grabbed the attention of
legal scholars, but the caricatured portrayal of common law and civil
law systems in those early papers3 prompted scathing criticisms.4
Chastened but unbowed, LLSV and other economists continued to
refine the theory.5 In a recent review of the substantial literature
 Lecturer in Law, University of Munich. LL.M., University of Chicago, 2000.
 Glen L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
1. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 285, 326 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta, Economic Consequences].
2. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131
(1997) [hereinafter La Porta, Legal Determinants]; Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance,
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta, Law and Finance].
3. See Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 46
(“Asked how much the group knew about common law and civil law when the project
commenced, Shleifer said, ‘Nothing, literally.’”).
4. In this essay, we focus on corporate law, where the criticisms of Legal Origins
Theory have been the strongest. See, e.g., Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law
Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
697, 734 (2005) (“[T]he difference between common law and civil law with regard to
shareholder protection is not as straightforward as the numbers in Law and Finance suggest—
at least not with regard to the corporate law of these traditions.”); Holger Spamann, On the
Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Antidirector Rights Index’ Under
Consistent Coding, at 1 (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 67/2006, 2006) (“Proper re-coding
reveals . . . that the results in La Porta et al. 1997, 1998 came about only through strong and
systematic measurement error (inconsistent coding).”).
5. The original measure of shareholder protection—which LLSV called the antidirector index—has been replaced by two other measures of shareholder protection. See
Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 461
(2008) [hereinafter Djankov, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing]; Rafael La Porta et al.,
What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta, What Works in
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generated by Legal Origins Theory, three of the LLSV authors
concluded, “Since their publication about a decade ago, the two
LLSV
articles
have
taken
some
bumps. . . .
[B]umps
notwithstanding, the basic contribution appears to us to still be
standing, perhaps even taller than a decade ago.”6
Despite this sanguine assessment of Legal Origins Theory, LLSV
have not persuasively described the mechanisms through which legal
origins facilitate economic development. The question asked by Paul
Mahoney still bedevils Legal Origins Theory: “Why should legal
origin affect economic growth?”7 In this paper, we explore one
proposed mechanism: adaptability. The adaptability hypothesis
suggests that “legal traditions differ in their ability to evolve with
changing conditions . . . and legal traditions that adapt efficiently to
minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the economy
and the legal system’s capabilities will foster financial development
more effectively than more rigid systems.”8
Economic development requires behavioral innovations, which
stretch the fabric of law. Thus, adaptability is said to be an essential
characteristic of a legal system that would facilitate economic
development. As we discuss in some detail below, the chief
methodological challenge confronting the empirical study of
adaptability is that researchers cannot measure adaptability directly.
Legal Origins Theory attempts to surmount this challenge, in the
first instance, by using legal institutions as proxies for adaptability.9
One of the foundational assumptions of Legal Origins Theory is that
courts engage in highly contextualized rulemaking that improves the
quality of law over time.10 Legal Origins Theory then takes this
Securities Laws?].
6. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 326.
7. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 506 (2001). Mahoney’s answer, though difficult to test empirically,
has been embraced by LLSV. Inspired in part by the work of Friedrich Hayek (including
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960), and FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY (1973)), Mahoney argued that “the common law is
historically connected to strong protection for property rights against state action, whereas the
civil law is connected to a strong and less constrained central government.” Mahoney, supra at
507.
8. Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J.
COMP. ECON. 653, 655 (2003) (citation omitted).
9. See La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 302–10.
10. Id. at 305.
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assumption one step further, asserting that “judicial law making and
adaptation play a greater role in common than in civil law.”11 Thus,
legal origin becomes a second-order proxy for adaptability. We
contend that adaptability is undertheorized and that a more nuanced
understanding of adaptability reveals the implausibility of legal origin
as proxy for adaptability.
II. THE PURPORTED LINK BETWEEN ADAPTABILITY AND
ECONOMIC SUCCESS
Legal Origins Theory begins with the following proposition:
“The two central dangers that any society faces are disorder and
dictatorship.”12 Four institutions—private ordering, private
litigation, regulation, and state ownership, ranked in order of
increasing state power13—control these two dangers. A “fundamental
tradeoff” inheres in the choice of institutions: “[A] state that has
more powers to control disorder also has more for dictatorial
11. Id. at 306.
12. Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595,
598 (2003).
Disorder refers to the risk to individuals and their property of private expropriation
in such forms as banditry, murder, theft, violation of agreements, torts, or monopoly
pricing. Disorder is also reflected in the private subversion of public institutions,
such as courts, through bribes and threats, which allows private violators to escape
penalties. Dictatorship refers to the risk to individuals and their property of
expropriation by the state and its agents in such forms as murder, taxation, or
violation of property. Dictatorship is also reflected in expropriation through, rather
than just by, the state, such as occurs when state regulators help firms to restrict
competitive entry. Some phenomena, such as corruption, reflect both disorder and
dictatorship. When individuals pay bribes to avoid penalties for harmful conduct,
corruption is a reflection of disorder. When officials create harmful rules to collect
bribes from individuals seeking to circumvent them, corruption is a cost of
dictatorship.
Id.
13. Id. at 601.
These four basic strategies differ in the degree of public control. No public
involvement is required with competition and private orderings. Courts employ
impartial judges enforcing the rules of good behavior. These rules do not even need
to come from legislation; rather, they may derive from custom or from judge-made
common law. Even in this case, the judge is a public agent with decision-making
authority. With regulators, the state writes the rules, inspects the product before it is
sold, and penalizes sellers for delivering a bad product. Both the scope of
government activity and its centralization are increased relative to independent
courts. Finally, with state ownership, the government takes complete control over an
activity.
Id.
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abuse.”14 The efficient institutional arrangement for a particular
society is the one that minimizes the social costs of controlling
disorder and dictatorship.
Historically, legal systems either evolved to satisfy these
competing demands15 or were imposed via transplantation.16 In
either event, Legal Origins Theory holds that the resulting legal
systems became important determinants of future economic
development. As noted above, adaptability has come to play a crucial
role in this story. According to Legal Origins Theory, adaptable legal
systems produce superior substantive law that, in turn, leads to
superior economic outcomes. While causation in Legal Origins
Theory runs from adaptability to substantive law to economic
outcomes,17 as we will see later, empirical support for the adaptability
hypothesis seems to begin with an examination of substantive law
and to flow backwards to an inference of adaptability.18
In Law and Finance, the seminal paper in Legal Origins
Theory,19 LLSV began with an idea about the possible role of law in
economic development, and they set out to test that idea by

14. Id. at 598–99.
15. Id. at 605 (“In the 12th and 13th centuries, France was relatively decentralized and
disorderly, with local notables successfully able to subvert all local institutions to their own
advantage. In contrast, England was relatively peaceful and the king maintained control over
the entire country. To counter disorder, it was efficient for France to adopt a legal system with
more dictatorship than England’s, even at the cost of greater scope for sovereign abuse of the
law.”).
16. Id. at 609 (“Although some institutional diversity can be explained by focusing on
efficient choices, transplantation is a dramatic deviation from this approach. As European
powers conquered much of the world in the 19th century, they brought with them their
institutions, including their laws. A significant portion of the institutional variation among
countries, especially with regard to legal systems, can be accounted for by transplantation.”).
17. Ironically, Legal Origins Theory is not much interested in the origins of law. One
could imagine telling a story in which a set of legal rules constituted a starting point from
which adaptation occurred. Under such a story, if path dependence played a prominent role,
the content of those initial rules would become an important predictor of later developments.
But Legal Origins Theory is not concerned with any substantive starting point. Instead, Legal
Origins Theory focuses on the substantive results of legal evolution. Under this story, the
importance of “legal origins” is procedural—the ability to adapt—not substantive.
18. While we suspect that LLSV would not phrase the point quite as we have done here,
their recent survey article concedes that research on adaptability is largely theoretical, and that
the limited number of attempts at empirical research on adaptability have produced mixed
results. See La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305.
19. Law and Finance was published in 1998, and Legal Determinants of External
Finance was published in 1997, but LLSV refer to the former as “our earlier article.” La Porta,
Legal Determinants, supra note 2, at 1131.
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examining the content of selected legal rules in forty-nine countries.
More specifically, LLSV theorized that some countries provide
greater legal protections to external investors than other countries,
and LLSV conjectured that the strength of these legal protections
would be correlated with levels of external investment. LLSV
collected data on legal rules relating to shareholder and creditor
protection, hoping to find that “differences in legal protections of
investors might help explain why firms are financed and owned so
differently in different countries.”20
In that first paper, they purported to find substantial differences
among countries with respect to the content of legal rules, and they
also noticed a pattern in their data that would come to define their
project. Differences in legal rules seemed to track two broadly
defined legal traditions: common law and civil law. LLSV also
observed differences among the three major families in the civil law
tradition: French, German, and Scandinavian.21 The implication of
these observations was that LLSV could “compare both the
individual legal rules and whole legal families across a large number
of countries.”22 More provocatively, their data on legal rules could
be combined with data on economic outcomes (e.g., per capita gross
national product) to permit judgments about the relative quality of
legal systems.23
The first paper did not make much progress on the correlation of
legal protections with levels of external investment, but in the
companion piece, Legal Determinants of External Finance, LLSV
presented data on financial markets and concluded that “the legal
environment has large effects on the size and breadth of capital
markets across countries.”24 The findings in these first two papers
were criticized on various grounds,25 but in a recent review essay,
LLSV claim, “We have corrected our mistakes and have moved on to
conceptually less ambiguous measures [that] have strengthened the
original results.”26
20. La Porta, Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1114.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1115.
23. Id. at 1133, 1142–43.
24. La Porta, Legal Determinants, supra note 2, at 1132.
25. For a useful summary of criticisms, see Mathias Siems & Simon Deakin,
Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future Research, J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. (2010).
26. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 291–92. The source of their pride
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In the first stages of the development of Legal Origins Theory,
LLSV did not discuss the adaptability hypothesis. Nevertheless, one
perceives some recognition of the need to explain why the common
law should provide better investor protections than the civil law. In
Legal Determinants of External Finance, for example, LLSV offered
this rather stark distinction between the two systems: “English law is
common law, made by judges and subsequently incorporated into
[legislation]. French, German, and Scandinavian laws, in contrast,
are part of the scholar and legislator-made civil law tradition, which
dates back to Roman law.”27 Over the ensuing years, LLSV have
developed a more nuanced understanding of legal systems, but they
continue to rely on the assumption that common law systems
depend more heavily on judge-made law than civil law systems, even
though legal scholars have pointed to the heavy reliance of common
law systems on statutes and regulations for the protection of
investors.28 Regardless of how this debate is resolved, the important
point for present purposes is that LLSV associate common law
systems with courts, and they associate courts with adaptability: “the
greater respect for jurisprudence as a source of law in the common
law countries, especially as compared to the French civil law
countries, suggests that common law will be more adaptable to the
changing circumstances.”29
The manner in which Legal Origins Theory has developed shows
that adaptability was an afterthought for LLSV. This is not to say
that adaptability is unimportant,30 but rather that it has not been

was a pair of articles measuring shareholder protection through self-dealing regulation and
securities laws, respectively. Djankov, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, supra note 5; La
Porta, What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 5.
27. La Porta, Legal Determinants, supra note 2, at 1131 (citation omitted). Note the
awkwardly phrased assumption that the common law is “subsequently incorporated into
legislature.” As discussed below, this assumption becomes a cornerstone of LLSV’s response to
legal scholars who claim that much of investor-protection law is codified.
28. See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 460 (2006); Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Diversity of Shareholder Protection in
Common Law Countries, 5 J. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS 3 (2007); Howell Jackson &
Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (Harv.
Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-28, 2009).
29. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305.
30. Indeed, absent an explanation for the superiority of the common law, one might
surmise that the correlation of legal systems with economic outcomes was simply correlation
without causation. For alternative hypotheses that have been suggested to explain the
correlation, see id. at 310–16.
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subjected to the same detailed attention as other aspects of the
project. Our reading of LLSV goes like this: countries with superior
economic outcomes tend to have superior substantive law (i.e.,
common law), which, by its very existence, implies superior
adaptability. In this research, economic outcomes and substantive
law are observed empirically, but adaptability is merely implied.
Thus, adaptability is not so much an explanatory variable or causal
mechanism as a designation that adheres to successful legal systems.
In the language of logicians, it is not a premise, but a conclusion. If a
country is economically successful, the legal system must be
adaptable.
The foregoing would be viewed as an exaggeration by LLSV,
who do not rely solely on logic for the proposition that common law
systems are more adaptable than civil law systems.31 Yet as matters
stand, LLSV’s notion of adaptability is severely undertheorized. In
what follows, we look more deeply into both the theoretical
foundations and the empirical support for the adaptability
hypothesis.
III. UNPACKING THE THEORY
Intuitively, the idea that adaptability of the law conduces to
better rules and from there to economic success is appealing.
Nevertheless, it is far from clear what “adaptability” in this account
actually means. Without a more precise understanding of the
concept, there is no way of comparing the degree of adaptability
among different jurisdictions. In the context of Legal Origins
Theory, we need to distinguish adaptability from other stories about
why common law jurisdictions supposedly differ from other legal
families, such as political explanations. Also, if adaptability is to
provide a causal link from legal origin to substantive merit,
adaptability must itself be distinct and separable from economic
outcomes. In this section, we clarify some of these conceptual issues
and define adaptability. As it turns out, adaptability is a rather
complex quality, which does not bode well for any test of a
hypothesis that presupposes the ability to compare adaptability across
jurisdictions.

31. As a matter of theory, they rely on FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY (1960). See La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305. For the role of the
courts as a proxy for greater adaptability of the common law, see infra Part IV.B.
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A. Defining Adaptability
As a first shot, an adaptable legal system should be one that
responds efficiently to changes in regulated behavior when existing
legal rules are not up to the task. We therefore begin by
contemplating changes in regulated behavior, which we call
behavioral innovations. A behavioral innovation is any deviation from
a familiar pattern of behavior. The term “innovation” is not meant to
suggest that the new behavior is desirable from a social perspective.
A behavioral innovation can create value, but it may just as well
produce large costs for society. For example, value-enhancing
innovations in business and finance might include milestone
financing in venture capital contracts, stock option compensation for
management, and the index fund. By contrast, some innovations
serve the interests of the innovators but impose social costs
exceeding the benefits. “Bad” innovations may be new ways of
exploiting an agency relationship, such as shifting assets from the
balance sheet to misrepresent earnings, inventing novel methods for
asset tunneling, or filing frivolous lawsuits to extort unjustified
ransom payments. The category of value-destroying innovations
emphasizes the law’s role in curbing agency costs. Adaptability
implies that the law responds quickly and effectively to new agency
problems and does not allow them to hamper economic activity for
an extended period of time. In this regard, adaptability takes up
investor protection as a main theme of Legal Origins Theory.
Most innovations cannot be easily categorized as either valueenhancing (“good”) or value-destroying (“bad”), but an optimal
legal system would be adept at sorting innovations so as to permit
and even encourage value creation while suppressing harmful
innovations. Thus, adaptability must be more than random responses
to behavioral innovations. On the other hand, one cannot simply
infer adaptability from superior economic outcomes or from superior
legal rules. In doing so, the concept of adaptability would cease to be
an explanation, other than a tautological one. To account for the
substantive quality of legal rules, therefore, adaptability must be
something distinct and separable from economic or legal outcomes.
What makes adaptability more than a truism is the responsiveness
of the legal system. A legal system may choose not to react to a
behavioral innovation because rule-makers adhere to excessively
“formalist” views, because they consider the costs associated with a
change to outweigh the benefits of the change, or because they are
1560
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lazy. Whatever the reasons, responsiveness refers to the possibility
that a behavioral innovation would not cause a change in law, even
though a new legal rule might be superior in some respects to the
existing legal rule. The adaptability of a given legal system, therefore,
depends on both (i) the responsiveness to behavioral innovations
(i.e., readiness to change the law in reaction to a change in regulated
behavior) and (ii) the proficiency in devising efficient legal rules (i.e.,
the probability that the response is in fact value-enhancing).
Under this account of adaptability, legal rules may be less than
optimal either because the legal system failed to respond to a
behavioral innovation or because the responses, past or present,
produce rules that are substantively deficient. The fact that legal
systems differ in their responsiveness to change is not a new
observation. For instance, many commentators claim that civil law
courts are more “formalist” than common law courts in applying
legal authority and, therefore, less responsive to behavioral
innovations. But even when the courts (or legislatures or regulatory
agencies) are ready to respond to behavioral innovations, the new
legal rules that they create will not necessarily be value-enhancing.
Responsiveness, standing alone, is insufficient to produce the desired
results. Law-making institutions also have to produce good legal
rules with some consistency.
B. The Optimal Amount of Adaptability
The capability of legal institutions to devise value-enhancing
rules is undeniably important, but the responsiveness of legal
institutions to behavioral innovations can be a two-edged sword.
When a law-making institution changes a legal rule, the institution
engages in a new policy analysis instead of subjecting the behavior to
existing legal rules. Thus, responsiveness implies rejection of legal
authority.
It follows that the more responsive a legal system, the less people
can rely on legal authority to predict how the law is going to deal
with their behavior. As individual cases are never exactly alike, a lawmaking institution can almost always find some amount of behavioral
innovation to distinguish present circumstances from the past. At
extreme levels of responsiveness, the existing body of legal authority
would cease to provide meaningful guidance for behavior. We
perceive, therefore, a tradeoff between the benefits of responsiveness
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and the law’s role in guiding behavior.32 Thus, a legal system may
not only suffer from too little responsiveness (and adaptability), but
also from excessive responsiveness (and a lack of predictability).33
The optimum amount of responsiveness depends on how important
predictability is for a given type of behavior. It also varies with the
degree of proficiency of the law-making institution because
responsiveness is more valuable if it is more likely to result in an
efficient rule.
The tradeoff between responsiveness (adaptability) and
predictability is still consistent with Legal Origins Theory’s story that
the common law is more efficient because it is more adaptable. It
may be that civil law jurisdictions are below the optimal level of
adaptability, and that being more adaptable would be more efficient.
However, the opposite can just as well be true: the more adaptable
jurisdiction may have moved beyond the optimum where greater
adaptability, on balance, hurts business activity more than it fosters
desirable innovation. If we assume that common law jurisdictions are
more adaptable, this could be a driver of economic success, but also
an impediment to it. In any event, increasing the adaptability of the
law—and hence making the law less predictable—is not a general
policy advice to enhance overall efficiency.
IV. UNPACKING THE EVIDENCE (WHAT LITTLE THERE IS)
In theory, adaptability can explain why a particular jurisdiction
has superior legal rules, though the argument is more complicated
than the original conjecture. The even greater challenge lies in
putting the theory to a test.
A. The Daunting Difficulty of Observing Adaptability
To detect a link between adaptability and legal rules one must be
able to measure the degree of adaptability in a given jurisdiction.

32. See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Adaptability in Elbonia, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 393,
404–05 (2006) (arguing that adaptability tends to collide with legal certainty).
33. The debate on charter competition provides an example in point: Delaware has been
accused of keeping its law excessively indeterminate. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998)
(arguing that indeterminacy increases Delaware’s market power); Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205,
1232 (2001) (explaining indeterminacy as a means of price discrimination in the market for
corporate charters).

1562

DO NOT DELETE

1553

2/10/2010 12:55 PM

Unpacking Adaptability

This is not a trivial exercise. As noted above, Legal Origins Theory
seems to suggest that the best evidence of adaptability is the sort of
robust economic development associated with countries that have
the preferred legal system (i.e., common law). Of course, this is not a
viable strategy for testing the adaptability hypothesis because it
assumes the very link that it seeks to detect. In fact, we cannot think
of any promising way to capture the proficiency aspect of
adaptability, other than looking at the results of the rulemaking
process.34 Measuring adaptability, therefore, focuses on measuring
the law’s responsiveness to behavioral innovations.35
Unfortunately, responsiveness is an evasive feature as well. A
plausible approach would be to look at the amount of rule change in
a jurisdiction. But what exactly constitutes a rule change? One might
imagine a quantitative measure of new rules created by the legislature
or regulatory agencies.36 Because statutes and regulations are
formally enacted and promulgated, there is a clear-cut event that
marks the change in applicable rules. But even if one arrived at a
method for counting such rule changes, it would only reflect the
responsiveness of legislatures and regulators. As we will see, LLSV’s
claim that common law jurisdictions are more adaptable than their
civil law counterparts rests critically on the role of the courts.
Leaving out rule changes brought about by the courts would miss an

34. One potential avenue would be to measure the resources devoted to rulemaking.
However, at least with regard to the courts, it is difficult to separate rulemaking from simple
adjudication. The sheer volume of litigation does not appear to be a good proxy for the courts’
ability to create efficient rules.
35. In a recent study of legal evolution, John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele, and
Mathias Siems describe two types of study that can contribute to our understanding of the
links between law and financial development. The study of “outcomes” would ask whether
changes in particular legal rules lead to changes in financial markets (or vice versa), while the
study of “mechanisms” would examine changes in the various protections afforded to
shareholders, creditors, or workers. John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence
from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J.
COMP. L. 579, 579–80 (2009). Outcome studies could attempt to test the adaptability
hypothesis by measuring either proficiency (when the studies ask whether changes in particular
legal rules lead to changes in financial markets) or responsiveness (when the studies ask
whether changes in financial markets lead to changes in particular legal rules). Armour et al.
use the study of mechanisms to propose an alternative to the adaptability and political
channels, which they call the “institutional channel.” Id. at 596.
36. For a study in this vein, see Katharina Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, 31
J. COMP. ECON. 676, 689–91 (2003) (counting major changes to corporate law statutes in ten
jurisdictions).
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important mechanism of adaptability—the most important one
according to Legal Origins Theory.
At the same time, measuring the amount of new rules created by
the courts is next to impossible. The key difficulty lies in
distinguishing between applying an existing rule and creating a new
one. When confronted with a behavioral innovation, a court can still
invoke an existing rule—and will tend to do so—to decide the case.
The observer is then left to determine if applying the rule to the fact
pattern amounts to “changing” the rule, which would require a
definition of the original rule’s scope as a reference point. It is hard
to see how such an analysis might be conducted with a minimum
degree of reliability.
Summing up, there is little hope of observing the amount of rule
changes as a proxy for the law’s responsiveness and hence
adaptability. In view of the methodological difficulties, it is hardly
surprising that evidence for or against the adaptability hypothesis has
remained scarce.37 The only argument that LLSV have put forward
on behalf of the adaptability hypothesis is a rather indirect piece of
evidence—the role of the courts as a proxy for adaptability.
B. The Uncertain Role of the Courts
Legal Origins Theory claims that adaptability is an important
comparative advantage of common law systems over civil law
systems. The source of the common law’s comparative advantage is
courts, and what LLSV admire about courts is that “the ability of
judges to react to changing circumstances—the adaptability of
common law—tends to improve the law’s quality over time.”38 The
only attempt at studying the court-adaptability nexus empirically has
been undertaken by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross
Levine, who contrasted two theories of why legal origin influences
economic development—the “adaptability channel” and the
“political channel”—and concluded that “legal origin matters
because legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust efficiently to
evolving socioeconomic conditions.”39 Unfortunately for LLSV, the

37. See Siems, supra note 32, at 399–403 (providing an extensive collection of proxies
for adaptability).
38. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305.
39. See Beck et al., supra note 8, at 672.
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limitations of this study are substantial. The authors identify only
two “indicators” of adaptability for each country:
(1) “Case law” is a dummy variable borrowed from an LLSV
paper,40 which gives the case law variable a value of 1 if “judicial
decisions in a given country are a source of law.”41 Otherwise, the
variable is assigned a value of 0.42 To determine whether a country
is in one category or the other, LLSV relied on the International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, published in 1973.43
(2) The other indicator is “legal justification,” which “indicates
whether judgments are based on statutory law rather than on
principles of equity.”44 This variable is also borrowed from an
LLSV paper,45 and it is assigned a value of 0, 0.33, 0.67, or 1,
“where higher values signify the legal system imposes greater
requirements that judgments be based on statutory law.”46

While we applaud the effort of the authors to bring some rigor
to the analysis of adaptability, we find these variables much too
simplistic. Even if the variables were coded with care, whether
judicial opinions are a “source of law” is the sort of inquiry that does
not lend itself to binary resolution. Moreover, we agree with Mathias
Siems that the legal justification variable is “too limited[,] as the
degree of legal adaptability of a particular country depends on a
larger set of criteria.”47
The dearth of explicit empirical support is but one shortcoming
of LLSV’s claim that the greater reliance on courts makes the
common law more adaptable. Ironically, the supposedly superior
substantive law identified in Legal Origins Theory does not consist
primarily of judge-made rules. In Law and Finance, LLSV identified
eight rules relating to shareholder protection: one share-one vote,
proxy by mail, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting
or proportional representation, oppressed minorities mechanism,

40. Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445, 451
tbl.1 (2004) [hereinafter, La Porta, Judicial Checks and Balances].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 469.
44. Beck et al., supra note 8, at 664.
45. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453, 465 tbl.1 (2003) [hereinafter
Djankov, Courts].
46. Beck et al., supra note 8, at 664.
47. Siems, supra note 32, at 398.
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preemptive rights, percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary
shareholders meeting, and mandatory dividends.48 With one possible
exception (minority oppression),49 all of these topics are governed in
the United States by statutory provisions, not by judge-made law.
Therefore, if courts were the engines of adaptability, they would
have only minimal influence over investor protection as initially
conceived by LLSV.
After this initial effort was criticized for being too simplistic,50
LLSV developed two new measures of shareholder protection. First,
in What Works in Securities Laws?,51 LLSV examined the role of
securities laws in the issuance of new equity in public capital markets.
They concluded that “securities laws matter,” and the securities laws
that matter most are disclosure rules and anti-fraud rules.52 These
results are consistent with the expansive and evolving notion of
“legal origins” that now informs Legal Origins Theory, namely, that
“common law stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to
support private market outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace
such outcomes with state-desired allocations.”53 Nevertheless, it is
hard to discern a way in which they support the adaptability
hypothesis. While private litigation may be an important avenue for
fraud prosecution in common law countries, the legal rules
governing fraud are generated almost exclusively by the Securities
and Exchange Commission or trading organizations, such as the
New York Stock Exchange. Simply stated, this rulemaking structure

48. La Porta, Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1122–23.
49. Minority oppression is often regulated through private litigation over common law
fiduciary duties, but the exception is only “possible” because many states codify rules relating
to minority oppression. For a description of the evolution of the cause of action of shareholder
oppression, including both legislative and judicial developments, see Robert B. Thompson, The
Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993).
50. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 4 n.6 (2001) (“By no means is it here
implied that these rights are unimportant, but they seem to supply only partial and sometimes
easily outflanked safeguards, which have little to do with the protection of control and the
entitlement to a control premium.”).
51. La Porta, What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 5.
52. Id. at 27–28.
53. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 286. With respect to securities
laws, LLSV reasons, “The benefits of common law appear to lie in its emphasis on private
contracting and standardized disclosure and in its reliance on private dispute resolution using
market-friendly standards of liability.” La Porta, What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 5,
at 28.
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does not contemplate a special role for courts in improving the
quality of law as “judges . . . react to changing circumstances.”54
A similar shortcoming with respect to the adaptability hypothesis
afflicts the second new measure of shareholder protection, found in
The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing.55 In this article, LLSV
construct an “index of the strength of minority shareholder
protection against self-dealing by the controlling shareholder (antiself-dealing index)”56 based on variables developed from a survey of
Lex Mundi law firms.57 The authors point to the UK as the
prototype of self-dealing regulation among common law countries,
but the strength of the UK system does not reside in the courts.
Indeed, LLSV observed that when courts were ineffective,
“legislators stepped in to put constraints on self-dealing.”58
Common law and civil law systems may exhibit a “pronounced
difference” in shareholder protection,59 but that difference for the
most part does not reside in the use of courts.60
While many scholars other than LLSV have argued that legal
origin is a viable proxy for “adaptability”—loosely defined—Legal
Origins Theory seems to have no need for adaptability that emanates
from courts. LLSV recognize this fundamental incoherence in the
adaptability hypothesis, and they attempt to elide the problem by
claiming that statutes are simply codifications of past judicial
opinions.61 While this is certainly true in some cases, including
54. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305.
55. Djankov, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, supra note 5.
56. Id. at 432.
57. As noted by LLSV, “Lex Mundi is an association of international law firms with
members in 108 countries.” Id. at 431.
58. Id. at 439.
59. Id. at 462.
60. But the authors observe, “The U.S. seems to be the exception, with its greater
emphasis on ex post litigation rather than ex ante disclosure and approval.” Id. at 463. Given
that self-dealing regulation in the United States is accomplished, to a great extent, by fiduciary
duty litigation, we could imagine an adaptability story on this topic that cast courts in the
leading role. While one would still have the burden of showing a connection between fiduciary
law and economic outcomes, this does not seem like an implausible tale. Ironically, in the
moment when we see an opening for the adaptability hypothesis, LLSV foreclose the
possibility by concluding that courts are not an important part of self-dealing regulation in
most of the world.
61. See, e.g., La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 290 (“Statutes in
common law countries often follow and reflect judicial rulings, so jurisprudence remains the
basis of statutory law. Even when legislation in common law countries runs ahead of judicial
law making, it often must coexist with, and therefore reflects, preexisting common law rules.”).
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minority oppression statutes,62 it is not true with regard to many
rules examined in the foregoing articles. LLSV also claim that
statutes in common law countries are less precise than their
counterparts in civil law jurisdictions,63 though this sounds like the
generalization of a person who has never hefted a volume containing
federal securities laws. Finally, in the ultimate bootstrapping
argument, LLSV assert, “because legal origins shape fundamental
approaches to social control of business, even legislation in common
law countries expresses the common law way of doing things.”64
Even if we accepted the notion that all of the rules relating to
shareholder protection identified by LLSV were dependent in some
fundamental way on judicial action, the adaptability hypothesis
would be woefully incomplete because it exaggerates the backwardlooking nature of adaptability. Implicit in early attempts to think
about the importance of adaptability to economic development is the
idea that law is reflexive. While judges certainly consider the
prospective effects of their rulings, the principal orientation of courts
is backward looking. Legislatures and regulatory agencies, on the
other hand, tend to make laws in anticipation of future events, albeit
with an eye on the lessons learned in the past. While legislators and
bureaucrats may be responding to past factual developments, the
principal orientation of legislatures and regulatory agencies in rulemaking mode is forward looking.
Law typically adapts both through backward-looking and
forward-looking actions. For example, changes in the shareholder
census in the United States over the past several decades and the
resulting increase in shareholder activism have prompted
various
innovations
in
private
ordering,65
litigation,66
62. Thompson, supra note 3.
63. See, e.g., La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 291 (“[S]tatutes in
common law countries are often highly imprecise, with an expectation that courts will spell out
the rules as they begin to be applied.”).
64. Id.
65. The rise of corporate governance ratings agencies is one important manifestation of
private ordering as a result of increased shareholder activism. On the dubious quality of such
ratings, see Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance
Ratings? (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No.
360, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093.
66. Shareholders have been actively pursuing more expansive participation in corporate
governance through innovative lawsuits. See, e.g., Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737 (Del.
Ch. 2006) (relating to a shareholder-proposed bylaw limiting the duration of a boardauthorized rights plan to one year); Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Am.
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regulation,67 and legislation.68 These changes are part of an iterative
process, with law responding to changes in facts and facts responding
to changes in law.
The foregoing analysis reaffirms that adaptability is an attribute
of all legal institutions. This insight implies the need to channel legal
reforms to the institution that is best equipped to provide such
reforms.69 LLSV favor legal systems that channel a higher percentage
of reforms through courts because “the ability of judges to react to
changing circumstances—the adaptability of common law—tends to
improve the law’s quality over time.”70 On the other hand,
legislatures and regulatory agencies may have a better capacity to
make wide-ranging policy decisions.71 We see no reason a priori to
favor one form of adaptation over the other, and we believe that
Legal Origins Theory favors courts primarily because this view
provides an ex post justification for the observation that economic
outcomes tend to be more favorable in common law countries than
civil law countries.72
Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (relating to a shareholder-proposed bylaw
permitting shareholder-nominated candidates to be included on the corporate ballot).
67. The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed “changes to the federal
proxy rules to remove impediments to the exercise of shareholders’ rights to nominate and
elect directors to company boards of directors.” Securities Release No. 33-9046, June 10,
2009,
“Facilitating
Shareholders
Director
Nominations,”
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-9046.pdf.
68. Delaware recently amended the General Corporation Law to allow a corporation to
adopt a bylaw that would require the corporation to include shareholder nominees for director
positions on the corporation's proxy statement, subject to limitations set forth in the bylaws.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009).
69. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 INT’L L. & POL. 931
(2003); Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law
Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Incomplete Law Theory (European Corporate Governance
Institute, Working Paper No. 01/2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=343480.
70. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305.
71. The relative competencies of legislatures, agencies, and courts have occupied many
volumes of legal scholarship. We need not attempt to synthesize that learning here, where the
point is simply that legislatures and agencies may be in a better position to adapt than courts.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 608,
616–17 (1992) (“Legislatures may be better equipped to draw upon technical expertise than
courts,” and while “[l]egislatures were intentionally devised to make changing laws difficult
(absent rather broad agreement on the need for change) . . ., a legislature can delegate
rulemaking authority to an agency, so that rules may be changed more readily.”).
72. In an important study of procedural formalism in courts, LLSV observe that many
institutions—including reputations, informal discussions, regulatory agencies, and courts—
secure property and enforce contracts, but “[e]conomic theory does not tell us which of
these . . . is the best.” Djankov, Courts, supra note 45, at 454. Although many economists
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V. CONCLUSION
The impossibility of measuring adaptability directly has
prompted Legal Origins Theory to rely on the role of the courts as a
proxy for adaptability. We have argued that this argument fails to
connect with the differences in substantive law that—according to
LLSV—are responsible for the competitive advantage of common
law jurisdictions. For the time being, adaptability in Legal Origins
Theory is a theoretical construct, not an empirical concept. An
alternative empirical approach might start from the premise that the
more adaptable a jurisdiction becomes the less predictable it is.
Indeterminacy of the law could thus serve as a proxy for adaptability
(responsiveness). A recent study comparing the degree of
indeterminacy of corporate fiduciary duties in Delaware, the United
Kingdom, and Germany concludes that German law seems to rely
more on indeterminate standards than the two common law
jurisdictions.73 This first piece of evidence runs against the notion
that common law courts are more ready to adapt the law to changing
circumstances. As it stands, the adaptability hypothesis is still a far cry
from conclusively explaining the superiority, real or alleged, of the
common law.

have assumed that courts are the best institution for securing property and enforcing contracts,
LLSV found that “even . . . simple disputes are resolved extremely slowly by courts in most
countries,” though the results show “huge variation among countries in the speed and quality
of courts.” Id. The key factor driving delays is “procedural formalism,” and LLSV argue that
less procedure generally leads to more efficiency. Id. at 511.
In another line of research on courts, Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer argue that
judicial independence is one of the defining characteristics of the common law. Edward L.
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002). In a later empirical
study of judicial independence, LLSV find that “judicial independence is empirically strongly
associated with common-law legal origin and is itself a strong predictor of some of the same
economic freedoms as common law.” La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, supra note
40, at 449. Thus, “judicial independence accounts for some . . . of the beneficial effects of
common law on economic freedom.” Id.
Both of these lines of research suggest that common law courts are better than civil law
courts in ways that matter to economic development, but neither line of research tells us that
courts are better able to promote adaptability than other legal institutions.
73. Jens Dammann, Regulatory Competition and Legal Determinacy in Corporate Law
(Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. Law and Econ. Res. Paper No. 166, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491864.
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